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JERRY L. MASHAW*
David Strauss has provided an elegant analysis of the law and economics
of racial discrimination in employment.' If his argument is correct, our cur-
rent approach to racial discrimination in employment is, at the very least,
suboptimal. Whatever the niceties of our increasingly sophisticated argu-
ments concerning "disparate treatment" versus "disparate impact" analyses,
we are unlikely to make much progress toward the ultimate goal of ending
employment discrimination unless we turn our attention to prescribing quo-
tas, rather than denying any intention to do so. Strauss's suggestions thus
have a decidedly radical flavor. Had he been given only the task of demon-
strating that law and economics analysis does not lead inexorably to con-
servative political positions, he would have succeeded admirably. As it is,
Strauss's law and economics radicalism is merely a by-product of his success-
fully accomplishing his role for this conference, providing a strikingly new
agenda for the discussion of racial discrimination in employment.
In this comment I do not want to argue with Strauss's economic analysis.
I agree with virtually all of it, and there are those better equipped than I am
for that task. Instead, I want to discuss two different issues. The first, to put
the matter starkly, concerns Strauss's attempt to make beliefs about the exist-
ence, prevalence, or causes of discrimination virtually irrelevant to public
policies attempting to remedy racial disparities in employment. The second
concerns the institutional structure that might be implied by Strauss's pre-
scriptions. Although both topics could be thought of as questions of "imple-
mentation" or "implementability," the first focuses on issues of political
morality, and the second on questions of bureaucratic feasibility.
I. TAKING DISCRIMINATION OUT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICY
As I understand his basic argument, Strauss assumes that virtually every-
one opposes discrimination in employment based on the racial animus of em-
ployers, customers, or employees.2 It is probably also true that most
Americans oppose the use of racial classifications as a substitute for other-
wise unavailable information when such stereotyping penalizes groups that
historically have been oppressed. 3 Presumably one or the other type of dis-
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crimination describes the subject matter (or the alleged subject matter) of the
tens of thousands of employment discrimination suits and complaints that
arise each year in the United States. Strauss's point is not that these attempts
at individualized remedies are misguided, only that they are likely to be inef-
fective at remedying racial discrimination in employment. 4 The litigation
touches only a part of the potential problem, that part most likely to be
solved by market forces even in the absence of antidiscrimination laws. 5 He
urges us to abandon this morality play of "good" plaintiffs versus "evil" de-
fendants and get on with the business of eliminating both the vestiges of past
discrimination and the present reality of racial stratification in employment
markets.
6
I think there is much that is persuasive in Strauss's indictment of the effi-
cacy of our current policies. Nevertheless, I think he passes too quickly over
the crucial question of the role of morality in politics. Strauss recognizes
that the simple quota solution he advocates is very similar to a tax and trans-
fer scheme that provides compensatory payments to all minorities currently
disadvantaged in labor markets. 7 Indeed, Strauss recognizes that a simple
transfer policy might have certain efficiency advantages over his proposal, 8
but he does not think it is politically realistic to attempt compensatory justice
using this institutional mechanism. 9 Invoking a "political counterpart of the
theory of the second best,"' 0 Strauss wants to employ the current consensus
against discrimination in employment to create a quota system that will
achieve the same compensatory objectives by awarding jobs rather than
cash. " This system promises to ameliorate class stratification problems by
giving a job rather than a stipend, thus raising the status of minorities as well
as their incomes.
Strauss has difficulty, however, elaborating the moral sentiments that
would support such a radical redirection of antidiscrimination energies. As a
vast affirmative action scheme employing explicit quotas, his proposal con-
fronts the apparent distaste of broad segments of the population for affirma-
tive action, and the recent refusal by even the most fervent legislative
advocates of antidiscrimination laws to admit that they are arguing for quo-
tas. 12 This raises an obviously troublesome issue: Why do public officials
4. Id. at 1644.
5. Id. at Part IV.A.2.
6. Id. at Part IV.c.
7. Id. at 1630.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1631.
10. Id. at 1630.
11. Id. at 1631.
12. E.g., Holmes, On Job Rights Bill, a Vow to Try Again in January, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1990,
§ A, at 25, col. I ("The bill's proponents argued at first that their bill did not go beyond Griggs, and
that because there had not been a pervasive use of quotas since Griggs, the measure would not foster
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flee from the position that Strauss hopes to implement by relying on a broad
political consensus opposing employment discrimination?
The answer, I take it, is quite straightforward: While Strauss tells us that
the facts about the persistence of employment discrimination are unavaila-
ble13 and that one must remain agnostic over the question of whether current
disadvantage is the effect of past discrimination,' 4 embracing his remedy on
moral grounds commits us to a view on both issues. Unless the existence of
current discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination are per-
vasive, racial stratification in employment has no moral significance. And,
while one might be concerned that existing remedies for disparate treatment
are underinclusive, it is hard to imagine that we must resort to Strauss's
solution merely to deal with that problem.
Yet, as Strauss well knows, when we enter the murky area of the morality
of quotas, people's intuitions vary significantly.' 5 To think that covert or
unconscious racial discrimination in employment is widespread is to think
that many, if not most, of us are racists, and a significant proportion of the
population is likely to reject that view of their existing conduct or social
consciousness. The notion that employment disadvantage is the result of
prior discrimination and, therefore, demands current compensatory action
confronts other beliefs that blame current economic inequality on the atti-
tudes and behaviors of minority employees and job applicants. Finally, even
if current racial minorities are the appropriate recipients of compensatory
social action, is it clear that nonminority employees and job applicants
should be the "donors" of the social surplus-jobs and income-needed to
effectuate compensation?
I confess that my own moral intuitions are much the same as Strauss's (or,
should I say, those that I am reading into his text). I believe covert or un-
conscious racism is not just widespread, but ubiquitous. I suspect that it
infects a huge proportion of marginal hiring decisions and is the most signifi-
cant single cause of racial stratification in employment and under-investment
of human capital by minorities-both all-too-familiar aspects of the contem-
porary scene. Nevertheless, these assumptions are debatable by reasonable
people, and I suspect that those of contrary persuasions significantly out-
number Strauss and me. Therefore, if Strauss's program is to be the program
quotas."); Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives By One Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1990, § A, at 1, col. 3 ("The measure's supporters insist that it was not a quota bill .... ); Holmes,
Rights Leaders Reject Bush Proposal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, § A, at 15, col. 1 ("Congressional
Democrats and civil rights figures today denied that their bill would lead to quotas as the Adminis-
tration has contended."); On Civil Rights: No Steps Back N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, § A, at 12, col.
1 ("The bill is no quota bill.") (editorial).
13. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1648.
14. Id. at 1620.
15. Id. at 1625-26.
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for eliminating racial discrimination in employment in this decade, we need
both better facts about racism's effect on current levels of employment strati-
fication and a better articulated moral vision, one that will capture the moral
sense of those whose consensus on the desirability of quotas is critical to
success.
Strauss's proposal is vaguely reminiscent of arguments that social security
pensions that are "wasted" on the nonpoor aged population should be shifted
to children and young people who lack the level of public support necessary
for their development. 16 The problem with that argument, like Strauss's, is
that it imagines that the ethical and political underpinnings of social security
pension insurance can be retained while the money is transferred to a differ-
ent clientele. That people have been proposing this solution for decades with
little effect suggests that there is something wrong with the argument. The
problem is that the self-help underpinnings of social security entitlements
simply cannot be transferred to need-based benefit programs for noncon-
tributors. Judging by our behavior, we give more money to social security
pensioners because we believe they deserve it. We give less to poor children
and their families because we worry about corrupting them. Our public mo-
rality may be confused, but it is there, at the level of moral argument, that
the issue must be confronted.
17
I doubt that Strauss's strategies for avoiding this moral question can be
successful. His proposal alters the idea of discrimination in ways that are
morally relevant to developing the political consensus necessary for the adop-
tion of a broad system of employment quotas, but I fear he lacks an effective
strategy for achieving that consensus. Nationwide employment quotas can-
not be achieved by stealth, and a politician willing and able to promote such
a program effectively is nowhere in sight.
II. BUREAUCRATIC IMPLEMENTATION
While Strauss is surely not to be faulted for speaking so little about the
institutional structures necessary to give reality to his proposals, I often find
that I can see clearly what a proposal means only by thinking more con-
cretely about its bureaucratic details. Because policy analysis is always a
matter of comparative incompetence, contrasting the messy current state of
affairs with an abstract, and apparently ideal, solution is a temptation that we
should seek to avoid.
16. See, e.g., Davidson, Social Security Rip-Off, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1985, at 12;
Samuelson, The Elderly Aren't Needy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1988, at 68; When Social Security's
Anti-Social, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, § 4, at 22, col. 1.
17. See generally T. MARMOR, J. MASHAW & P. HARVEY, AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WEL-
FARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 22-52 (1990) (discussing the multiple
and conflicting bases for social welfare programs).
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Strauss's sketch of his institutional proposal has four elements: (1) a quota
system based on the percentage of minorities in the national population; (2)
fines for failure to meet the quotas; (3) a cost-justification defense; and (4) an
enforcement bureau modeled on the National Labor Relations Board.'"
The details of this scheme could be developed in any number of ways and I
will not attempt that task here. I merely want to raise a few questions about
implementation in order to suggest the level of detail that any viable proposal
would have to attain, and some of the disputes that will arise around those
details. I do not raise these questions to suggest that Strauss's proposal is
necessarily infeasible, but instead as proposals for discussion about the imple-
mentation of any large-scale quota system.
Two elements of the scheme are intricately related-the cost justification
defense and the level of the fine. In Strauss's view the fine should be set to
reflect "the gains to society, net of costs, that result from racially proportion-
ate hiring and compensation practices."' 9 He recognizes that solving this
social welfare puzzle is a tall order, but then states that using fines makes an
elaborate cost justification defense unnecessary; employers can simply pay
the fine if it is too costly to comply. 20 This suggestion seems to assume that
the fine will be set at a level that will allow employers to remain in business.
But why the fine level should allow any noncomplying employer to remain in
business is nowhere explained. Indeed, my own untutored intuition is that
fines should be spectacularly high so that the national priority of eliminating
the corrosive effects of continued racial stratification in the United States can
be met. Therefore, I would expect many high cost employers to be driven
out of business by this scheme unless some cost justification defense is avail-
able or, the equivalent, such a defense smuggled into the scheme by the level
of the fine imposed.
A different remedial structure might avoid the problem of setting the ap-
propriate fine. Because Strauss's scheme uses a national, numerical target, it
is similar to the objective, quantitative standards in certain health and safety
regulatory schemes, particularly air and water pollution. It might be sensi-
ble, therefore, to think about a system of trading "surplus minority hires,"
much in the same way that excess pollution control can be traded by low-cost
to high-cost compliers. 21 Indeed, if we use a national population standard in
setting the percentage quotas, we must either allow trading or resign our-
18. Strauss, supra note 1, at Part IV.D.
19. Id. at 1656.
20. Id.
21. See generally Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?,
13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988). There may be some technical differences between the "excess
hires" and "excess emission reduction" markets, but none that would make trading infeasible in the
minority quota context.
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selves to the fact that there will be widespread noncompliance until large
numbers of minority persons or firms relocate themselves.
Of course, mentioning the possibility of trading excess quota compliance
reveals a host of subsidiary issues. For one, it reraises the question of polit-
ical morality. Even in emission trading systems there are complaints about
selling "rights to pollute." Selling "rights to discriminate" looks even worse.
Indeed, it is in an attempt to avoid this dilemma that Strauss suggests a sys-
tem of fines rather than a system of redistribution for eliminating employ-
ment barriers. 22 Yet, if the fines cannot be set precisely, failure to allow
trading may result in massive undercompliance (fine too low) or massively
costly compliance (high fines with substantial differentials in employer capac-
ities to comply).
Using fines has other disadvantages. A nationally based quota system will
give very substantial advantages to employers located in regions with excess
minority population. Firms in other regions will have to shift locations or
import minority employees to comply. Ironically, the proposed scheme
would give many of the former slave states a strong economic incentive to
fight for an affirmative action plan implemented by a nationwide quota. The
analytic point, however, is simply that Strauss's scheme necessarily entails
regional redistributions of the sort that has plagued air quality politics.
23
The difficulty of setting an appropriate fine level and the possibility of re-
gional dislocations argue strongly for the use of injunctive remedies with
tradeable quota rights rather than fines. But, whatever the remedy, I am not
attracted to enforcement solely by a bureaucracy. As in similar situations,
this device is a way of sweeping the question of the appropriate level of both
penalties and compliance under an opaque and unreviewable bureaucratic
rug.24 If we want Strauss's plan, or its equivalent, to be enforced, then em-
ployers should face the threat of private lawsuits in addition to bureaucratic
enforcement. Not only does bureaucratic enforcement elsewhere in Ameri-
can government have a strong bias toward underenforcement, 25 the only
quota systems in employment of which I am aware--employment of the
handicapped in a number of western European countries-are widely ig-
nored in the absence of private rights of action.
26
This is not to suggest that one should energize private litigants by the pros-
22. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1655.
23. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (analysis of the
East-West political implications of the Clean Air Act's requirement of scrubbers on coal producing
plants).
24. See, e.g., Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
653 (1985) (lamenting restrictions on reviewability of agency enforcement discretion).
25. See, e.g., J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
(1970).
26. See Chernick, Organizing to Promote the Employment of Persons with Disabilities-The Expe-
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pects of pots of gold at the end of litigation rainbows or reintroduce the
litigation uncertainties that plague current antidiscrimination efforts. An in-
junctive remedy and attorney's fees could energize private enforcement
under a scheme in which the facts of compliance or noncompliance would be
extraordinarily simple.27 Either the employer has the proper proportion of
minority employees (or minority employees plus purchased "discrimination
rights") or it does not. There is no need, in the absence of some exquisite
cost justification defense, to commit prosecution to bureaucratic discretion.
This type of enforcement system would be a clear signal that, as a society, we
want Strauss's program to be fully implemented. Thinking about the imple-
mentation of quotas from this perspective poses the right question concern-
ing their desirability.
rience of France, in FORGING LINKAGES: MODIFYING DISABILITY BENEFITS TO ENCOURAGE
EMPLOYMENT 33-37 (M. Berkowitz ed. 1990) (discussing obligations to hire handicapped workers).
27. This approach is now widespread in environmental legislation. Suits are nonetheless rather
sparse because of hidden and non-obvious violations, complex environmental economic disincen-
tives, and regulatory preemption of obvious and potential claims. Feller, Private Enforcement of
Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 DEN. L.J. 553, 564-65 (1983).
These same factors may not be present in the area of employment discrimination, especially given
the direct economic impact on a potential plaintiff.
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